Friday, April 20, 2018

When do we take "yes" as an answer from North Korea?

It has recently been revealed that CIA Director Mike Pompao, at the direction of President Trump, made a secret trip to meet with North Korean dictator Kim Jong-Un as part of the advance planning for a summit meeting between Kim and President Trump.

A CIA Director was an odd choice for such an assignment, but Mike Pompao is also the nominee undergoing Senate confirmation hearings to be the new Secretary of State to replace Rex Tillerson.  It now appears that Pompao's chances of being approved in committee are about 50/50 (based on his hawkish foreign policy views, as well as his ultraconservative social issues positions);  but Mitch McConnell will bring it directly to a senate floor vote anyway.

That's all another story.   Here I want to focus on North Korea and what appear to be remarkable reversals in its stance toward negotiations with the United States.

Choe Sang-Hun has reported for the New York Times that Kim Jong-un has made a key concession in advance of the meeting with President Trump:

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Kim Jong-un, North Korea’s leader, has removed a key obstacle to negotiations with Washington by no longer demanding that American troops be removed from South Korea as a condition for denuclearizing his country, the South’s president, Moon Jae-in, said Thursday.  Choe continues:

"For decades, the reclusive country . . . has persistently demanded the withdrawal of 28,500 American troops in South Korea, citing their presence as a pretext to justify its development of nuclear weapons. . . .  Mr. Moon said North Korea no longer included that demand in the list of things it wanted in return for giving up its nuclear weapons. . . .

"President Trump sent the C.I.A. director, Mike Pompeo, to Pyongyang  to meet with Mr. Kim to assess how serious . . . Korea was about negotiating away its nuclear weapons. . . .  Mr. Moon said North Korea was already showing a willingness to make concessions.

“'The North Koreans did not present any conditions that the United States could not accept, such as the withdrawal of American troops in South Korea,' Mr. Moon told newspaper publishers in Seoul . . . 'They only talk about an end to hostilities against their country and about getting security guarantees,' he said. 'It’s safe to say that the plans for dialogue between the North and the United States could proceed because that has been made clear.'

"When Mr. Moon’s special envoys met with Mr. Kim in Pyongyang early last month, Mr. Kim said his country would no longer need nuclear weapons if it did not feel 'threatened militarilyand was provided with 'security guarantees.' . . . 

"Since the 1990s, North Korean officials have occasionally told the Americans and South Koreans that they could live with an American military presence in the South if Washington signed a peace treaty and normalized ties with the North. Mr. Kim’s father and predecessor, Kim Jong-il, sent Kim Yong-soon, a party secretary, to the United States in 1992 to deliver that message.

"When South Korea’s president at the time, Kim Dae-jung, met with Kim Jong-il in Pyongyang in 2000, the North Korean leader was quoted as saying that keeping American troops in Korea for 'stability in Northeast Asia' even after a reunification was 'not a bad idea, provided that the status and the role of U.S. troops be changed.'
  
“'It is desirable that U.S. troops stay as a peacekeeping force in Korea, instead  of a hostile force against the North,' Kim Jong-il said, according to the book 'Peacemaker,' by Lim Dong-won, who attended the 2000 inter-Korean summit meeting.

"At a forum organized this month by the Seoul-based website Newspim, Mr. Lim said that although North Korea had regularly demanded the withdrawal of American troops, it was important to differentiate its 'propaganda policy' from its 'real policy.'  Mr. Lim, a former unification minister of South Korea, said he believed that the North could accept an American military presence and negotiate away its nuclear weapons if it was offered the right incentives. . . .

"Mr. Moon dismissed concerns that the United States might end up recognizing North Korea as a de facto nuclear power in return for a promise from it to freeze its nuclear and missile programs.

“'I don’t think there is any difference between the parties over what they mean by denuclearization,' Mr. Moon said. 'North Korea is expressing a willingness to denuclearize completely.'

"In Seoul’s and Washington’s separate planned summit meetings with Mr. Kim, Mr. Moon said there would be 'no big difficulties' in reaching 'broad agreements in principle' in which North Korea would agree to denuclearize in return for normalized ties with the United States, international aid to help rebuild its economy and a peace treaty to formally end the 1950-53 Korean War. The challenge is in working out a detailed road map to carry out such a deal, he said.

"Analysts and former negotiators said the countries would face extremely complicated negotiations on how to verify that North Korea was not cheating on its commitment to denuclearize, as it has been accused of in the past, and on when to provide security guarantees and other incentives. Past agreements to denuclearize North Korea all collapsed in disputes over how to verify a freeze of its nuclear activities.

“'As they say, the devil is in details,' Mr. Moon said."


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If we didn't have to put Kim's past behavior of untrustworthiness into the mix, this sure sounds like he's trying to get to "Yes" with the United States.   And it could be completely true.    How do we assess it -- especially with an Asian department at State so decimated by the Trump-Tillerson firings and inaction on replacements?   Those seasoned State Department diplomats and the behind-the-scenes researchers and policy-makers are irreplacable.   They have to be built up over time.

But what if Kim is more rational than we thought, if he sees the reality of his nation's poverty, and he truly only wants recognition and help?   How do you put aside the fact that, within the past two years he has had one of his own relatives assassinated to preserve his own power?    How do you trust someone like that?

'Tis a puzzlement.    I only wish that we had our old State Department top-to-bottom staff ready to handle this.   Instead, we have Trump.  And we have Kim -- two men who may be madmen.  And it's very telling that, at this point, I'm thinking that Kim might be the more stable, reasonable one.

Ralph


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