This struck me as a very lucid explanation of what's going on between Saudi Arabia and Iran and how it's affecting the whole Middle East. Thanks to Nick Robins-Early for the World Post:
"Every week, The WorldPost asks an expert to shed light on a topic
driving headlines around the world. Today, we speak with New York
University Professor Mohamad Bazzi about the Saudi-Iran rift.
"On the second day of 2016, Saudi Arabia killed 47 prisoners in a series of executions across the kingdom. Prominent Shiite cleric and
dissident Sheikh Nimr al-Nimr was among those executed, and after news
broke of his death, a group of demonstrators stormed the Saudi embassy
in Iran's capital in protest.
"Saudi Arabia responded this week by cutting off diplomatic ties with Iran, worsening already hostile relations between the two powers. The escalating rift between predominantly Sunni Saudi Arabia and
mostly Shiite Iran now threatens to increase sectarian tensions, as well
as make conflicts in the region even more convoluted and intractable.
"The WorldPost spoke with New York University Professor Mohamad Bazzi,
who is currently working on a book about Iranian-Saudi relations. . . .
"Why do you think Saudi Arabia decided to initiate this latest escalation with the execution of Sheikh Nimr al-Nimr?
"Well there’s several layers to this, beginning with domestic factors and then extending to the Saudi-Iran rivalry. Many of the people who were executed had been in Saudi prisons for
years, and the core group of people were associated with al Qaeda and
had been responsible for a series of attacks in 2003 and 2004.
"That was 43 of the 47 people?
"Yes, the breakdown was 43 Sunnis and 4 Shiites, which interestingly
corresponds to the proportion of Shiites in the Saudi population. The
message that the Saudis wanted to send was that dissent won’t be
tolerated, whether it’s Sunnis or Shiites.
"The Saudi regime, at first, seemed like they were concerned with the
domestic ramifications of the execution. They were worried that if they
had only executed Sunnis, it might lead to protest and a backlash within
the Sunni community in Saudi Arabia, which is their constituency.
"The message that the Saudis wanted to send was that dissent won’t be tolerated, whether it’s Sunnis or Shiites. That seemed to be the
initial Saudi calculation, to balance out the execution and to divert
tension that they were executing so many al Qaeda prisoners.
"It is also a projection of strength from the new king, Salman,
because the death sentence against Sheikh Nimr was handed down under
former King Abdullah, and the international expectation seemed to be
that it wouldn’t be carried out. Those are the domestic, internal calculations. In terms of
international calculations, Saudi Arabia has been worried about Iran for
quite a while, but especially since the nuclear deal over summer.
"Did the perception that the U.S. is normalizing ties with
Iran, or that Iran is going to have a larger influence in the region
following the nuclear deal, play into the decision to execute Nimr?
"Well the Saudis have just been dismayed since the nuclear deal. The
Saudis have been worried that this will open a path towards
normalization between Iran and the West, especially the United States.
"The Saudi regime seems to believe that if the U.S. opens up to Iran,
then somehow that would mean the U.S. abandoning Saudi Arabia and its
traditional Sunni-Arab allies in the gulf. That’s because the Saudi-Iran
rivalry has become a zero-sum game in so many ways. The Saudis and the Iranians have begun to think that if one country
gains in the region or makes inroads with Western powers, it has to come
at the expense of the other. So the Saudis have been trying to find a way to undermine the nuclear
agreement, and to keep Iran from going down this path of normalization
with the West.
"In terms of the conflicts in Yemen and Syria, what impact will this recent deterioration between Iran and Saudi Arabia have?
"The wars in Syria and Yemen can’t be stopped without an agreement
between Iran and Saudi Arabia. And now with those two powers refusing to
speak to each other, the violence is likely to get worse. We’ve seen that already with Yemen. As this crisis was unfolding, the
Saudis announced that they were abandoning the ceasefire -- which
hadn’t entirely taken hold anyway -- and on Tuesday there were reports
that there was a much more intense bombardment of areas by the Saudis.
"In Syria, it’s a bit more complicated because the Saudis aren’t
involved directly. But we do have the peace talks scheduled for January
25, and the already dim prospects for those are now much dimmer.
"What do you think it would take for Saudi-Iran relations to improve?
"Some Saudi officials were asked a similar question a few days ago,
and their response was that Iran has to stop meddling in the affairs of
Arab countries, as they put it. Of course, they never said that they would stop meddling in the
affairs of Arab countries, they seem to see that as their right, seeing
themselves as the leader of the Arab world and the Muslim world.
"And [Iranian President] Rouhani made a similar statement about the Saudis not meddling in regional affairs as well.
"Right, and that’s not going to happen. Neither Saudi nor Iran are
going to stop meddling in the affairs of the region, they’re not going
to stop supporting proxies and allies in different countries, whether
it’s Yemen, Syria, Lebanon. So, that’s not going to happen, and it’s hard to see a way out of
this in the short term. Unless there is a significant breakthrough on
Syria, that could bring some confidence. That would entail really
effective maneuvering by Russia and the United States.
"In the short term, we’re also going to see the Saudis try more ways to isolate Iran again following the nuclear deal.
"What’s something that you think gets missed in the media when it comes to Saudi-Iranian relations?
Often overlooked is that this conflict is partly rooted in the
historical Sunni-Shiite schism, but for the most part it’s a struggle
for political dominance of the Middle East. Saudi Arabia and Iran both have a lot of experience using
sectarianism to instigate people in the region, and to play different
factions off one another, but most of the time it’s for political ends.
"It’s a classic struggle for influence, and it’s not a naturally
occurring phenomenon of ancient hatreds between Sunni and Shiites. The
history is there and the hatreds are there, but the sectarian sentiment
is often deployed by these states a part of a power game.
* * * * *
So it seems that the Saudis miscalculated in thinking they needed to worry about Sunni backlash, when in fact they've gotten a Shi'ia backlash, because they executived a revered cleric. If they had simply balanced the Sunni-Shi'ia population of Saudi Arabia in numbers, but not included Sheik Nimr, it would have been a one-day news event.
Also, it seems that perhaps the U.S. has not done enough to reassure Saudi Arabia that the Iran nuclear deal does not mean we're abandoning the Saudis, although I don't know what was done and what more might have been done. They would have opposed it, probably no matter what we did to placate them -- because, as Professor Bazze explained, this is about the struggle for power and control between the two dominate countries of the Middle East.
No matter how much we think it is not a zero sum game, the fact is that they do see it that way.
Ralph