U.S. and Iran

Fareed Zakaria has an article in the latest Newsweek, "Containing a Nuclear Iran," that is must read for anyone interested in our relations with Iran.

http://www.newsweek.com/id/216702/page/1

There are three basic options that the United States and its allies have regarding Iran's nuclear program. We can bomb Iran, engage it diplomatically, or contain and deter the threat it poses. Let me outline what each would entail and then explain why I favor containment and deterrence. . . .

One way to get instant gratification would be military force. . . . The first thing that would happen the day after such an offensive begins would be a massive outpouring of support for the Iranian regime. This happens routinely when a country is attacked by foreign forces, no matter how unpopular the government. . . . Recall that George W. Bush's approval rating on Sept. 10, 2001, was about 40 percent. After 9/11, it quickly climbed to 93 percent. . . .

Zakaria then goes on to explain that Iran would respond by activating the militias they support and causing attacks in Afghanistan, Iraq, Lebanon, and Gaza. Also of concern would be the reaction on the "Arab Street." This would be the third Muslim country the U.S. had attacked in the eight years since 9/11. At best, Zakaria explains, a military attack would delay but not eliminate Iran's nuclear ambitions. So the gain is simply not worth the cost.

What about increased diplomatic engagement?

So, the feeling goes, Washington needs to make a much more active effort to engage the Iranians, listening and responding to their concerns, allaying their suspicions, ending "regime change" policies and offering the real prospect of recognition to the Islamic Republic and normal relations with the United States. If we lessen their fears and concerns, in this view, Tehran's leaders will be more likely to cooperate on the nuclear front.

There is something to this line of thinking. The Iranians do have some legitimate security concerns. They live in a neighborhood surrounded by nuclear powers—Israel, Russia, China, India, and Pakistan. The Bush administration did needlessly alienate Iran right after Tehran had cooperated with Washington to oust the Taliban and set up the Karzai government in Kabul. And it ignored any gestures or concessions made by the reformist government of Mohammad Khatami, further undermining an already weak president.

But Zakaria then says that this is flawed analysis, because Iran does not really want to open up to the West. Its clerics' grip on power depends on not letting its citizens taste the freedom and modernity of the West. A more open society would inevitably increase the threat to their theocracy.

This leaves deterrence and containment. As I understand Zakaria's point, Iran has lately become something of a pariah (because of its nuclear ambition, the revelation of its deception and lying to the inspectors, and its obvious election fraud) not only in the West, but they are increasingly regarded with suspicion by other Islamic states.

The country is in a box and, if well handled, can be kept there until the regime becomes much more transparent and cooperative on the nuclear issue. To do so, we should maintain the current sanctions but should not add broad new ones like an embargo on refined-gasoline imports. Any new measures should target the leadership and factions like the Revolutionary Guards specifically. . . .

At the same time, we must stop exaggerating the Iranian threat. By hyping it, we only provide Iran with "free power" . . . This is an insecure Third World country with a GDP that is one 40th the size of America's, a dysfunctional economy, a divided political class, and a government facing mass unrest at home. It has alienated most of its neighboring states and cuts a sorry figure on the world stage, with an international embarrassment for a president. . . .

The ultimate solution to the problem of Iran will lie in an Iranian regime that understands it has much to gain from embracing the modern world. That doesn't mean Iran would forswear its efforts to be a regional power—all the losing presidential candidates in Iran endorsed the country's nuclear program—but it does mean that Iran would be more willing to be open and transparent, and to demonstrate its peaceful intentions. It would view trade and contact with the West as a virtue, not a threat. . . .

Can the West do anything to help the current regime evolve into something more open, modern, and democratic? The change has to come from within . . . . But we should not do anything to preclude internal evolution or more dramatic change in that country. The country is clearly deeply divided, and these divisions are not going to disappear.

There is some thoughtful analysis here. Just imagine how much President Obama has to know and understand about this one major problem -- and realize that this is only one of many even more complex issues, like health care reform, climate change, financial crisis, wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, the Middle East -- not to even mention the full-time critics at home and all the political winds trying to blow him away.

Ralph