This article is from Thomas L. Friedman in the New York Times, April 22, 2015. It has added a useful perspective to my understanding.
"Deal or No Deal?"
"The
Obama team’s effort to negotiate a deal with Iran that could prevent
the Iranians from developing a nuclear bomb for at least a decade is now
entering its critical final stage. I hope that a good, verifiable deal
can be finalized, but it will not be easy. If it were, we’d have it by
now. Here are the major challenges.
"First, you can negotiate a simple arms control agreement with an adversary you don’t trust. We did that with the Kremlin in the Cold War. By simple, I mean with relatively few moving parts, and very clear verification procedures that do not require much good will from the other side — like monitoring Soviet missile sites with our own satellites. You can also negotiate a complicated arms control deal with a country that shares your values: Japan and South Korea regularly submit their nuclear facilities to international inspections.
"First, you can negotiate a simple arms control agreement with an adversary you don’t trust. We did that with the Kremlin in the Cold War. By simple, I mean with relatively few moving parts, and very clear verification procedures that do not require much good will from the other side — like monitoring Soviet missile sites with our own satellites. You can also negotiate a complicated arms control deal with a country that shares your values: Japan and South Korea regularly submit their nuclear facilities to international inspections.
"But
what is hard to implement is a complex arms control deal with an
adversary you don’t trust — like Iran or North Korea. Each moving part
requires some good will from the other side, and, because there are so
many moving parts, the opportunities for cheating are manifold. It
requires constant vigilance. Are the United States, Russia, China and
Europe up for that for a decade? After the Iraq invasion, we took our
eye off North Korea, and it diverted nuclear fuel for a bomb. With Iran,
the U.S. Energy Department is planning to put a slew of new,
on-the-ground monitoring devices into every cranny of Iran’s nuclear
complex, which should help. But there also has to be zero-tolerance for
cheating — and a very high price if there is.
"Second,
for us, this is solely an arms control agreement. For Iran, this is “an
identity crisis” that it’s being asked to resolve, and it’s still not
clear it can do so, says Robert Litwak of the Wilson Center and the
author of “Outlier States: American Strategies to Contain, Engage, or
Change Regimes.”
"America’s
engagement with Iran, said Litwak, is like “the Cuban missile crisis
meets the Thirty Years’ War.” For us, this is a pure nuclear
negotiation, but, for Iran, the nuclear issue “is a proxy for what kind
of country it wants to be — an ordinary state or an Islamic
revolutionary state. And this divide goes back to the origins of its
revolution” in 1979. Most revolutions eventually go through some
cultural rebalancing that breaks its fever and turns it toward normalcy
and integration, Litwak added: “But Iran has never gone through that
process. It tantalized us with reformist presidents who didn’t really
hold power and when push came to shove never challenged the fundamentals
of the revolutionary deep state that had the monopoly on the use of
force” and control of its nuclear program.
"There
is a hard core in Tehran for whom nuclear weapons are not only a hedge
against foreign invasion but also a deliberate thumb in the eye of the
world meant to block the very integration that would open Iran to
influences from America and the West — an opening they fear would dilute
whatever revolutionary fervor is left in its youths, many of whom are
fed up with Iran’s isolation. That is why Iran’s supreme leader,
Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, was telling the truth when he recently said that
he has not made up his mind about this deal. He’s having an identity
crisis. He wants sanctions relief without integration. After all, if
Iran is a normal state, who needs a medieval cleric to be the “supreme
leader?”
"The challenge for Obama is whether he can do a deal with an Iran that, as Litwak puts it, “doesn’t change character but just changes behavior.” Obama’s bet — and it is not crazy — is that if you can get the right verification procedures in place and deprive Iran from making a bomb for a decade (that alone is worth a deal, given the alternatives) then you increase the odds of Iran’s own people changing Iran’s character from within. But then so much rides on implementing a fail-proof verification regime and “snapback” sanctions if Iran cheats.
"I think President Obama believes that nothing has stymied U.S. Mideast policy more in the last 36 years than the U.S.-Iran cold war, and if that can be prudently eased it would equal a Nixon-to-China move that opens up a lot of possibilities. Again, that’s not crazy. It’s just not easy given the forces in Iran who have an interest in being isolated from the West.
"Finally, you have the regional challenge. Iran, with about 80 million people, is simply a more powerful and dynamic state today than most of the Sunni Arab states to its west, half of which have collapsed. Iran, even if it had good intentions, almost can’t help but project its power westward given the vacuum and frailty there. When Nixon opened to China, and helped unleash its economic prowess, China was largely surrounded by strong or economically powerful states to balance it. But an Iran enriched by billions in sanctions relief would be even more powerful vis-à-vis its weak Arab neighbors. Our Gulf Arab allies are deeply worried about this and are looking to the U.S. for both protection and more sophisticated arms. I get that. But unless we can find a way to truly ease tensions between Shiite Persians and Sunni Arabs, we will find ourselves unleashing Iran to the max while arming the Arabs to the teeth. Maintaining that balance will not be easy.
"These are not reasons to reject the deal. They are reasons to finish it right."
* * *
I would add two thoughts:
1. It's not just the Sunni Arab states that feel threatened economically by a free Iran but also Israel. They speak of fearing an Iranian nuclear bomb; I think what they really fear is an economically powerful Iran.
2. The complexity of this also underlines why Obama cannot use his best arguments for this deal with his critics in Congress. He can't publicly be advocating something that Iran's clerics fear like the integration into Western society -- even if some of the dumb clucks in the Republican House could understand such complexity.
Ralph
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